Browsing: networking

What the FEC?
Auto-Detect is Finally Here for 25GE!

As technology marches forward new challenges arise that were not previously an issue. Consider as mankind moved from walking to horseback we cleared trails where there was once brush covered paths. As we transitioned from horseback to carriages those paths needed to become dirt roads, and the carriages added suspension systems. With the move from carriages to automobiles, we further smoothed the surface traveled by adding gravel. As the automobiles moved faster, we added an adhesive to the gravel creating paved roads. With the introduction of highways, we required engineered roads with multi-layered surfaces. Each generation reduced the variability in the road surface by utilizing new techniques that enabled greater speed and performance. The same holds true for computer networks.

Over the past three decades as we transitioned from 10Mbps to 25Gbps Ethernet we’ve required many innovations to support these greater speeds. The latest of these being Forward Error Correction (FEC). The intent of FEC is to reduce the bit error rate (BER) as the cable length increases. In 2017 we saw the ratification of the IEEE 25GbE specification which provides two unique methods of FEC. There is BASE-R FEC (also known as Firecode) and RS-FEC (known also as Reed Solomon). Both of these FEC algorithms introduce additional network latency as the signal is decoded, BASE-R is about 80 nanoseconds while RS-FEC is about 250 nanoseconds. The complexities don’t end here though, it turns out there are three different Direct Attach (DA) cable types with varying levels of quality, from good, to best we have:

  • CA-25G-L: up to 5m, requires RS-FEC
  • CA-25G-S: up to 3m, lower loss, requires either RS-FEC or BASE-R FEC
  • CA-25G-N: up to 3m, even lower loss, can work with RS-FEC, BASE-R FEC, or no FEC

But wait there’s more, if you order now we’ll throw in auto-negotiation (AN) and link training (LT) as both are required by the 25GbE IEEE standard (10GbE didn’t need these tricks). So what does AN actually negotiate? Two things, link speed and which type, if any, FEC will be utilized. It should be noted that existing 25GbE NICs that have been on the market likely only support one type of FEC. As for LT, it helps to improve the quality of the 25GbE link itself. It turns out though that the current generation of 25GbE switches came out prior to AN being worked out so support is at best poor to mixed. Often manual switch and adapter configuration are required. Oh, and did I mention that optical modules don’t support AN/LT? Well, they don’t, but some will support short links with no FEC.

So where does this leave people who want to deploy 25GbE? You need to be careful that both your network switch and server NICs will work well together. We strongly advise that you do a proof of concept prior to a full deployment. Not all 25G server NICs do both AN/LT because their chips (ASICs) were designed and fabricated prior to the completion of the IEEE specification for 25GbE last year. Solarflare’s 25GbE X2522 server NICs which debut next month include support for all the above, in fact, when initially powered up they will begin by:

  • First looking at cable, is it SFP or SFP28?
  • If it’s SFP28 it will attempt AN/LT, then 25G no AN/LT, then 10G
  • If it’s a 25G link, then it will try and detect which FEC is being used by switch

Additionally, the server administrator can manually override the defaults and select AN/LT and the FEC type and setting (auto, on, off).

I grew up in New York, and remember listening to Sy Sims on TV say “an educated consumer is our best customer…”

P.S. I’d like to give a special thanks to Martin Porter, Solarflare’s VP of Engineering, for pulling all this together into a few slides.

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The New Network Edge – The Server

Today cleverly crafted spear phishing emails and drive-by downloads make it almost trivial for a determined attacker to infect a corporate workstation or laptop. Wombat’s “State of the Phish 2018” report shows that 76% of InfoSec professionals experienced phishing attacks in 2017. Malware Remote Access Toolkits (RATs) like Remcos for Windows can easily be rebuilt with a new name and bound to legitimate applications, documents or presentations. Apple Mac users, myself included, are typically a smug group when it comes to Malware so for them, there’s MacSpy which is nearly as feature rich. A good RAT assumes total control over the workstation or server on which they are installed then it leverages a secure HTTPS connection back to their command and control server. Furthermore, they employ their own proprietary encryption techniques to secure their traffic prior to HTTPS being applied. This prevents commercial outbound web proxies designed to inspect HTTPS traffic from gaining any useful insights into the toolkits nefarious activities. With the existence of sophisticated RATs, we must reconsider our view of the enterprise network. Once a laptop or workstation on the corporate network is compromised in the above fashion all the classic network defenses, firewalls, IDS, and IPS are rendered useless. These toolkits force us to reconsider that the New Network Edge is the server itself, and that requires a new layer in our Defense in Depth model.

The data on our enterprise servers are the jewels that attackers are paid a hefty sum to acquire. Whether it’s a lone hacker for hire by a competitor, a hacktivist group or a rogue nation state, there are bad actors looking to obtain your companies secrets. Normally the ONLY defenses on the corporate network between workstations and servers are the network switches and software firewalls that exist on both ends. The network switches enforce sub-networks (subnets) and virtualized local area networks (VLANs) that impose a logical structure on the physical network. Access Control Lists (ACLs) then define how traffic is routed across these logical boundaries. These ACLs are driven by the needs of the business and meant to reflect how information should flow between different parts of the enterprise. By contrast, the software firewalls on both the workstations and servers also define what is permitted to enter and leave these systems. As defenses, both these methods fall woefully short, but today they’re the last line of defense. We need something far more rigorous that can be centrally managed to defend the New Network Edge, our servers.

As a representation of the businesses processes, switch ACLs are often fairly loose when permitting systems on one network access to those on another. For example, someone on the inside sales team sitting in their cubical on their workstation has access to the Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system which resides on a server that is physically somewhere else. The workstation and server are very likely on different subnets or VLAN within the same enterprise, but ACLs exist that enable the sales person’s workstation access to customer data provided by the CRM system. Furthermore, that CRM system is actually pulling the customer data from a third system, a database server. It is possible that the CRM server and the database server may be on the same physical server, or perhaps in the same server rack, but very possibly on the same logical network. The question is, is there a logical path from the inside sales person’s workstation to the database server, the answer should be no, but guess what? It doesn’t matter. Once the inside salesperson is successfully spear fished then it’s only a matter of time before the attacker has access to the database server through the CRM server.

The attacker will first enable the keylogger, then watch the sales person’s screen to see what they are doing, harvest all their user ids and passwords, perhaps turn on the microphone and listen to their conversations, and inspect all the outgoing network connections. Next, the attacker will use what they’ve harvested and learned to begin their assault, first on the CRM server. Their goal at this point is to establish a secondary beachhead with the greatest potential reach from which to launch their primary assault while keeping the inside sales person’s workstation as their fallback position. From the CRM server, they should be able to easily access many of the generic service machines: DNS, DHCP, NTP, print, file, and database systems. The point here is that where external attackers often have to actively probe a network to see how it responds, internal RAT based attacks can passively watch and enumerate all the ports and addresses typically used. In doing so they avoid any internal dark space honeypots, tripwires, or sweep detectors. So how do we protect the New Network Edge, the server itself?

A new layer needs to be added to our defense in depth model called micro-segmentation or application segmentation. This enforces a strict set of policies on the boundary layer between the server and the network. Cisco, Arista, and other switch providers, with a switch-based view of the world, would have you believe that doing it in the switch is the best idea. VMWare, with its hypervisor view of the world, would have you believe that their new NSX product is the solution. Others like Illumio and Tuffin would have you believe that a server-based agent is the silver bullet for micro-segmentation. Then there’s Solarflare, a NIC company, with its NIC based view of the world, and its new entrant in the market called ServerLock.

Cisco sells a product called Tetration designed to orchestrate all the switches within your enterprise and provide finely grained micro-segmentation of your network traffic. It requires additional Cisco servers be installed to receive traffic flow data from all the switches, processes the data, then provides network admins with both the visibility and orchestration of the security policies across all the switches. There are several downsides to this approach, it is complex, expensive, and can very possibly be limited by the ACL storage capabilities of the top of rack switches. As we scale to 100s of VMs per system or 1,000s of containers these ACLs will likely be stretched beyond their limits.

VMWare NSX includes both an advanced virtual switch and a firewall that both require host CPU cycles to operate. Again, as we scale to 100s of VMs per system the CPU demands placed on the system by both the virtual switch and the NSX firewall will become significant, and measurable. Also, it should be noted that being an entirely software-based solution NSX has a large attackable surface area that could eventually be compromised. Especially given the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities recently reported by Intel. Finally, VMWare NSX is a commercial product with a premium price tag.

This brings us to the agent-based solutions like Illumio and Tuffin. We’ll focus on Illumio which comes with two components the Policy Compute Engine (PCE) and the Virtual Enforcement Node (VEN). The marketing literature states that the VEN is attached to a workload, but it’s an agent installed on every server under Illumio’s control and it reports network traffic flow data into the PCE while also controlling the local OS software firewall. The PCE then provides visualization and a platform for orchestrating security policies. The Achilles heel of the VEN is that it’s a software agent which means that it both consumes x86 CPU cycles and provides a large attackable surface area. Large in the sense that both its agent and the OS-based firewall on which it depends can both be easily circumvented. An attacker need only escalate their privileges to root/admin to hamstring the OS firewall or disable or blind the VEN. Like VMWare NSX, Illumio and Tuffin are premium products.

Finally, we have Solarflare’s NIC based solution called ServerLock. Unlike NSX and Illumio which rely on Intel CPU cycles to handle firewall filtering, Solarflare executes its packet filtering engine entirely within the chip on the NIC. This means that when an inbound network packet is denied access and dropped it takes zero host CPU cycles, compared to the 15K plus x86 cycles required by software firewalls like NSX or IPTables. ServerLock NICs also establish a TLS-based domain of trust with a central ServerLock Manager similar to Illumio’s PCE. The ServerLock Manager receives flow data from all the ServerLock NICs under management and provides Visibility, Alerting and Policy Management. Unlike Illumio though the flow data coming from the ServerLock NICs requires no host CPU cycles to gather and transmit, these tasks are done entirely within the NIC. Furthermore, once the Solarflare NIC is bound to a ServerLock Manager the local control plane for viewing and managing the NIC’s hardware filter table is torn down so even if an application were to obtain root privilege there is no physical path to view or manage the filter table. At this point the, it is only capable of being changed from the specific ServerLock Manager to which it is bound. All of the above comes standard with new Solarflare X2 based NICs that are priced at or below competitive Intel NIC price points. ServerLock itself is enabled as an annual service sold as a site license.

So when you think of micro-segmentation would you rather it be done in hardware or software?

P.S. Someone asked why there is a link to a specific RAT or why I’ve included a link to an article about them, simple it validates that these toolkits are in-fact real, and readily accessible. For some people, threats aren’t real until they can actually see them. Also, another person asked, what if we’re using, that’s ok, as an attacker instead of hitting the CRM server I’ll try the file servers, intranet websites, print servers, or whatever that inside salesperson has access to. Eventually, if I’m determined and the bounty is high enough, I’ll have access to everything.

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2600, Attacking Enterprise Networks

Since 1984 the magazine “2600” has been the undisputed publication created by and for hackers and phone phreakers worldwide. The January 2017 cover to the right is misleading, the magazine isn’t named after the Atari system, but rather the 2600 Hz tone ATT used, that phreakers leveraged, to control long distance phone lines. Most article bylines are hacker handles, rather than proper names, as the articles themselves don’t always paint inside the numbers. In January 2017 a hacker with the handle “Daelphinux” published the first of a five-part series of articles titled “Successful Network Attacks – Phase One” and every quarter since then he’s published the next phase, with the final Phase Five hitting the streets today January 2, 2018. This collection of five articles is perhaps the most concise executive-level summary of how an attacker breaches an enterprise that I’ve read thus far. Hopefully, I won’t offend Daelphinux by attempting to summarizing the key points of his five articles in this single blog post. I strongly suggest that everyone reading this review the original text in these five issues of 2600.

Daelphinux classified a Successful Network Attack into five phases:

  1. Reconnaissance – “Gathering as much useful information about the targets as possible.”
  2. Scanning – “Gathering useful information about the target’s networks and any possible exploits.”
  3. Gaining Access – “Getting into the network to be able to accomplish the attack’s goal.”
  4. Maintaining Access – “Ensuring access to the network persists long enough to accomplish the attack’s goal.”
  5. Covering Tracks – “Obfuscating the attacker’s presence on the network such that they cannot be traced.”

Each phase builds on the first, with Daelphinux envisioning this as a pyramid with phase one on the bottom, and each successive phase building on the prior one. Attackers will need tools and skills at each level in order to conduct a successful attack. Defenders, the enterprise admins, will also need tools and skills for several phases to detect and defend against an attack.

Phase 1 – Reconnaissance. As defined by Daelphinux the attacker seeks to gather all the raw data they can on their target before actively engaging them. The key here is in gathering only the “useful” data, as an attacker will rapidly accumulate an enormous pile of information. This information should come from a wide variety of sources including, but not limited to: deep web searches, web crawling those results, calling all the targets publicly available phone numbers to learn everything they can about the target, draining “whois” databases for all known corporate DNS assets, launching phishing and email scams at targeted employes and generic email address, real-life social engineering by making new friends, and finally dumpster diving.

All these efforts will produce a heap of information, but most of it will be useless. Here is where intelligent sifting comes in. Important information is often in handwritten notes, or cast of printouts such as printer test configuration pages, IP table listings, usernames, equipment manufacturer shipping boxes, operating system manuals, internal organizational charts & structures, and corporate policies (especially password).

Recognizing these reconnaissance efforts is the initial step toward thwarting an attack. For example, reviewing security footage looking for dumpster divers might sound trivial, but differentiating between an attacker and someone looking something to sell for their next meal can be challenging. Other activities like social engineering become far more complex to detect via video surveillance as these activities appear as background noise. While this phase might be the toughest to detect, it is the easiest to defend against. If you can cut off the flow of information outside enterprise you can seriously hamper their reconnaissance efforts. To do this you can hide the whois records, destroy printed copies of purchase orders, destroy shipping boxes used to pack new servers or appliances, destroy discarded manuals, remove and clean printer hard drives, make sure all in-house shredders use cross-cut shredding and finally burn any really sensitive info that has already been shredded. Much of this can be addressed through procedures and training.

Phase 2 – Scanning, In April Daelphinux covered the details of this phase. He said that when an attacker moves on to phase two they are committed, and unlikely to walk away. This phase is the first real step where the attacker can’t evade detection as they have to deploy active tools to electronically gather as much insight as they can. Tools like: nmap, Nessus, Metasploit, ZAP, Xenotix or Grabber. Here they are looking to generate IP Maps, enumerate subnets, determine network speeds, the resilience of networks, open ports on clients, appliances & servers used, along with applications and the versions in production.  All this scanning will provide the attacker with another huge heap of data to sift through with the eventual goal being to define the attack vectors that define the real “meat” of the attack.

This phase is the last chance for a defender to stop an attack before valuable assets are stolen. During this phase, administrators might notice network slowdowns, so on detecting these and investigating see if one IP address or a small range of addresses is touching a wide range of resources if so you are likely in the process of being scanned. Attackers will often launch the scanning phase remotely. So using network address translation (NAT) internally, next-generation firewalls, and current IPS & IDS appliances can in some cases detect this. It is always strongly recommended to be current in patching all your appliances and to follow proper admin process.

Phase 3 – Gaining Access, was published in 2600 in July of 2017. Without gaining access an attack isn’t an attack. Some of the key tools used are Metasploit and ZAP, but they will also leverage trojans, zombies, and backdoors to gain multiple toeholds into the enterprise’s network. Attackers often use remote shells instead of graphical tools, as shells often prove to be faster, more flexible and powerful.

Typically attackers operate from an endpoint that is not their intended target, for example leveraging another user’s machine to attack a server. By using another unsuspecting endpoint if it becomes compromised they can then move onto another workstation within the enterprise network. Attackers are typically interested in copying, moving, deleting and or altering files. In this article we’re not interested in those seeking to launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, just those looking to exfiltrate value from the enterprise. Detecting attacks during this phase requires active monitoring, and the question is when, not if, you’ll detect an attacker. Doing active file audits, examining files that are changed outside of regularly expected intervals, watching for irregular traffic patterns, and reviewing access and error logs are all known methods of detecting an attack.

Phase 4 – Maintaining Access, was published in the October 2017 issue. This is the last phase where defending against an attack can successfully prevent data loss. Daelphinux stated that there are three things which should be kept in mind:

  1. The Attacker has already breached the network.
  2. The Attacker is actively attempting to achieve their goal.
  3. Less experienced attackers tend to get overly comfortable with their success at this point.

This is the stage at which attackers are at their most vulnerable. They are moving around in plain sight within your network and can be detected if you’re looking for them. Network monitoring is the key to detection in this phase, but also, unfortunately, detection at this phase is also based on hope. You as the defender are hoping you discover them, and they are hoping their connection won’t get them detected and severed.

Skilled attackers will setup precautions to prevent this. One of the attacker’s strategies will be to take over network monitoring tools in an effort to circumvent detection. Enterprises need a heavy level of paranoia at this point to ensure that they are checking everything. Looking for the use of uncommon ports or protocols is another method for detecting attackers. Typically Intrusion Prevention (IPS) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Security Information and Event Management Systems (SIEMS) are useful tools in ferreting out hackers. SIEMS themselves often are now targets for attackers. Multiple instances of these devices or appliances should be leveraged to thwart a takedown. Consider having these monitors watch each other, so in the event, one goes down you can use that as a potential indicator of an attack. If both or all monitors go down simultaneously then it’s very possible you’re under attack. Killing connections that meet certain criteria are vital to cutting off an attackers access, for example terminating connections that last longer than 25 minutes. Think that scene in the original “Transformers” when the general shouts “Cut the hard lines!”

Phase 5 – Covering Tracks, today January 2, 2018, we saw the latest issue of 2600 with Daelphinux final installment in the series on “Successful Network Attacks – Phase Five – Covering Tracks.” Once an attacker has reached phase five they’ve taken what they need, and now the coverup begins. Attempting to defend against this phase “is a form of damage control,” at best you’re preserving forensic evidence to hopefully reconstruct what they took after the fact. An attacker has to leave as cleanly as they entered otherwise they could dilute some of the value of what was taken. As Daelphinux points out, what good is a list of users and passwords if the passwords have all been changed. The same holds true of Malware and backdoors, you can’t sell a backdoor into an enterprise if it has been removed.

The best defense against this is redundant, and perhaps even hidden copies of logs. Attackers will often sanitize the logs they find, but they rarely go looking for additional copies of logs, especially if some effort has been made to hide and even secure them. It’s possible that if you have automated your logging such that multiple copies are generated, and accesses are tracked the attacker will notice this in phase three and just avoid it. Attackers will normally obfuscate both their IP and MAC addresses to further frustrate tracking them, often using addresses already on the network. Again, as mentioned in phase three setting connection limits, timeouts, and alerts when these are reached is often a good way to thwart or even detect an attacker. It should also be noted that attackers will often escalate their privilege on a system so they can disable logging. As Daelphinux noted disabling logging will often generate its own log event, but then after that, you won’t know what was done. Some attackers may even just erase or corrupt log files on the way out the door, a sort of “salt the earth” strategy to make determining what was taken that much more difficult. Regardless, a company will need to make some determinations on what was stolen or affected and alert their customers. A recent Ponemon report states that just cleaning up and dealing with a data breach in the US often costs companies $244/record.

Hats off to Daelphinux for authoring “Successful Network Attacks,” and “2600, The Hacker Quarterly” for publishing it.

I hope everyone has a Happy and Secure New Year.

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Ultra-low Latency Networking for Windows, Is There a Need?

At a Flagg Management HPC on Wall Street event back in 2011, then CEO of Myricom Nan Boden, was pitching the concept of Ultra-low Latency for Windows. As a setup for this concept, she asked the audience how many used Linux for their low latency trading platforms. I was sitting in the back, but could easily see many, but not all hands were in the air. She then asked how many used Windows, and from the back, I saw a few lonely hands. Following the session, I commented on how few people were interested, and she said that was correct from my viewpoint in the rear. From her position on the stage nearly half had hands up, just in front of their bodies so few others could see. It was as if low latency trading on Windows were some dirty little secret.

Later that year in August 2011 Myricom went on to release DBL for Windows. While I remained there for another two years following this event, and handling sales for the Eastern region, all those hidden raised hands lead to very few sales, but why? Price was not the issue, DBL for Windows was extremely aggressively positioned against Linux. It wasn’t performance, while it was a measurable amount slower than Linux, it was still considerably faster than default Windows. We never were able to ferret out what the actual issue was. If you’re a Windows user craving ultra-low latency, please consider reaching out to me and sharing your story.

Thank you all for your time this year, and Happy Holidays.

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Kernel Bypass = Security Bypass

As we move our performance focused applications to kernel bypass techniques like DPDK and Solarflare’s Onload this does not come without a price, and one component of that price is often security. When one bypasses the Linux kernel, they are also bypassing its security mechanisms (ex. XDP and NFTables, formerly IPTables). These security mechanisms have evolved over the past decade to ensure that your server doesn’t get compromised. Are they perfect no, software rarely is, but they are an excellent starting point to secure your Linux server. So as we move to kernel bypass platforms what options are available to us? We need to define lower level network security checkpoints that can be used as gatekeepers to keep the good stuff in and the bad stuff out. With one exception these are often hardware products that are managed using several different networking segmentation metaphors: micro, macro, and application which is also known as workload.

Micro-segmentation is the marketing term that has been co-opted by VMWare to represent its NSX security offering. When you’re a hypervisor company all the worlds a virtual machine (VM) so moving security into the hypervisor is a natural fit. VMWare then plays a clever trick and abstracts the physical network from the VM by installing a virtual network to which it then connects the VM. The hypervisor then works as the switch between the physical and virtual networks. To support coordinating workloads and security across multiple hypervisors running on different physical servers VMWare goes one step further and encapsulates traffic. This enables it to take traffic running on one virtual network and bridge it over the physical network to a virtual network on another host. So if your kernel bypass application can run from within a VM without having to rely on hypervisor bypass, then this model might work for you. Illumio has also attached itself to micro-segmentation, but rebranding it “smart micro-segmentation.” Our understanding is that they essentially run an agent that then programs NFTables in real time, so for kernel bypass applications this would offer no security.

Macro-segmentation, as you might guess, means creating segmented networks that span multiple external physical network devices. This is the term that Arista Networks has chosen (originally they used micro-segmentation, perhaps until VMWare stepped in). Macro-segmentation is the foundation for Arista’s CloudVision line of products. While this too does an awesome job of securing your network it doesn’t come without cost, which is complexity. CloudVision connects into VMWare NSX, Openstack and other OVS DB based controllers to enable you to seamlessly configure various vendors hardware through a single interface. Furthermore, it comes with configuration modules called configlets for a wide variety of hardware that enables you to quickly and easily duplicate data center functions across one or more data centers. It also includes a configlet builder tool to quickly empower an administrator to craft a configlet for a device for which one does not exist.

The last solution is application or workload segmentation. In techie terms, this is five-tuple filtering and enforcement of network traffic. Which to the layperson means opening the network packet up, inspecting the protocol it uses, along with the source and destination addresses and ports. Then taking these five values and comparing them to some collection of filter tables to determine the appropriate action to take on the packet. Today this can be done by Solarflare ServerLock NICs or applications like XDP or NFTables. ServerLock NICs do this comparison in 50 to 250 nanoseconds within the firmware of the NIC itself, entirely transparent to the server the NIC is installed in. In doing it this way the process of filtering consumes no host CPU cycles, is agnostic to the OS or applications running, and it scales with every NIC card added to the server. Packets are filtered at wire-rate, 10Gbps/port, and there can be one filter table for every locally hosted IP address with a total capacity exceeding over 5,000 filters/NIC. As mentioned, all of this filtering is done in the NIC hardware without any awareness of it by the DPDK or Onload applications running above it.

So if you’re using DPDK or Onload, and the security of your application, or the data it shares, is of concern to you, then perhaps you should consider engaging with one of the vendors mentioned above.

If you’d like to learn more about ServerLock, please drop me an email.

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Gone in 98 Nanoseconds

Imagine a daily race with hundreds of top fuel dragsters all lined up rumbling along in parallel waiting for the same green Christmas tree light before launching off the line. In some electronic markets, with specific products, every weekday morning this is exactly what happens. It’s a race where being the fastest is the primary attribute used to determine if you’re going to be doing business. On any given day only the top finishers are rewarded with trades. Those who transmit their first orders of the day the fastest receive a favorable position at the head of the queue and are likely to do some business that day. In this market, EVERY nanosecond (a billionth of a second) of delay matters, and can be monetized. Last week the new benchmark was set at 98 nanoseconds, plus your trading algorithm, in some cases 150 nanoseconds total tick to trade.

“Latency” is the industry term for the unavoidable network delays, and “Tick to Trade Latency” aggregates together the network travel time for a UDP market data signal to arrive at a trading system, and for that trading system to transmit a TCP order into the exchange. Last year Solarflare introduced Application Nanosecond TCP Send (ANTS) and lowered the “Tick to Trade Latency” bar to 350 Nanoseconds. ANTS executes in collaboration with Solarflare’s Application Onload Engine (AOE) based on an Altera Stratix FPGA. Solarflare further advanced this high-speed trading platform to achieve 250 Nanoseconds. Then in the spring of 2017 Solarflare collaborated with LDA Technologies. LDA brought their Lightspeed TCP cores to the table and replaced the AOE with a Xilinx FPGA board once again lowering the “Tick to Trade Latency” to 120 Nanoseconds. Now through further advances, and moving to the latest Penguin Computing Skylake computing platform, all three partners just announced a STAC-T0 qualified benchmark of 98 nanoseconds “Tick to Trade Latency!”

There was even a unique case in this STAC-T0 testing where the latency was measured at negative 68 nanoseconds, meaning that a trade could be injected into the exchange before the market data from the exchange had even been completely received. Compared to traditional trading systems which require that the whole market data network packet to be received before ANY processing can be done, these advanced FPGA systems receive the market data in the packet in four-byte chunks and can begin processing that data while it is arriving. Imagine showing up in the kitchen before you wife even finishes calling your name for dinner. There could be both good and bad side effects of such rapid action, you have a moment or two to taste a few things before the table is set, or you may get some last minute chores. The same holds true for such aggressive trading.

Last week, in a Podcast with the same name we had a discussion with Vahan Sardaryan, CEO of LDA Technologies, where we went into this in more detail.

Penguin Computing is also productizing the complete platform, including Solarflare’s ANTS technology and NIC, LDA Technologies Lightspeed TCP, along with a high-performance Xilinx FPGA to provide the Ultimate Trading Machine.

The Ultimate Trading Machine

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Equifax & Micro Segmentation

Earlier this week it was reported that an Equifax web service was hacked creating a breach that existed for about 10 weeks. During that time the attackers used that breach to drain 143 million people’s private information. The precise technical details of the breach, which Equifax claims was detected and closed on July 29, has yet to be revealed. While it says it’s seen no other criminal activity on its main services since July 29th that’s of little concern as Elvis has left the building. At 143 million that means a majority of the adults in the US have been compromised. Outside of Equifax specific code vulnerabilities or further database hardening what could Equifax have done to thwart these attackers?

Most detection and preventative counter measures that could have minimized Equifax’s exposure employ some variation of behavior detection at one network layer. They then shunt suspect traffic to a sideband queue for further detailed human analysis. Today the marketing trend to attract Venture Capital investment is to call these behavior detection algorithms Artificial Intelligence or Machine Learning. How intelligent they are, and to what degree they learn is something for a future blog post. While at the NGINX Conference this week we saw several companies selling NGINX layer-7 (application layer) plugins which analyzed traffic prior to passing it to NGINX’s HTML code evaluation engine. These plugins receive the entire HTML request after the OS stack has assembled it from multiple network packets. They then do a rapid analysis the request to determine if it poses a threat. If not then the request is passed back to NGINX for the web application to respond to. Along the way, the plugin abstracts metadata from the request and in parallel, it shoots that up to their cloud service for further evaluation. This metadata is then compared against prior history and other real time customer data from with similar services to extract new potential threat vectors. As they are detected rules are then pushed back down into the plugin that can be applied to future packets.

Everything discussed above is layer-7, the application layer, traffic analysis, and mitigation. What does layer-7 have to do with network micro segmentation? Nothing, what’s mentioned above is the current prevailing wisdom instantiated in several solutions that are all the rage today. There are several problems with a layer-7 solution. First, it competes with your web application for host CPU cycles. Second, if the traffic is determined to be malicious you’ve already invested tens of thousands of CPU instructions, perhaps even in excess of one hundred thousand instructions to make this determination, all that computer time is lost once the message is dropped. Third, the attack is now deep inside your web server and whose to say the attacker hasn’t learned what he needed to move to a lower layer attack vector to evade detection. Layer-7 while convenient, easy to use, and even easier to understand is very inefficient.

So what is network micro segmentation, and how does it fit in? Network segmentation is the act of altering the flow of traffic such that only what you want is permitted to pass. Imagine the factory that makes M&Ms. These days they use high-speed cameras and other analytics that look for deformed M&Ms and when they see one they steer it away from the packaging system. They are in fact segmenting the flow of M&Ms to ensure that only perfect candy coated pieces ever make it into our mouths. The same is true for network traffic, segmentation is the process of only allowing network packets to flow into or out of a given device via a specific policy or set of policies. Micro segmentation is doing that down to the application level. At Layer-3, the network layer, that means separating traffic by the source and destination network address and port, while also taking into account the protocol (this is known as “the five tuple”, a set of five elements). When we focus on filtering traffic by network port we can say that we are doing application level filtering because ports are used to map network traffic to applications. When we also take into account the local IP address for filtering then we can also say we filter by the local container (ex. Docker) or Virtual Machine (VM) as these can often get their own local IP address. Both of these items together can really define a very specific network micro segmentation strategy.

So now imagine a firewall inside a smart network interface card (NIC) that can filter both inbound and outbound packets using this network micro segmentation. This is at layer-3, the Network, micro segmentation within the smart NIC. When detection is moved into the NIC no x86 CPU cycles are consumed when evaluating the traffic, and no host resources are lost if the packet is deemed malicious and is dropped. Furthermore, if it is a malicious packet and it’s stopped by a firewall in the NIC then the threat has never entered the host CPU complex, and as such, the system’s integrity is preserved. Consider how this can improve an enterprise’s security as it scales out both with new servers, as well as adding containers and VMs. So how can this be done?

Solarflare has been shipping its 8000 line of smart NICs since June of 2016, and later this fall they will release a new firmware called ServerLock(TM). ServerLock is a first generation firewall in the smart NIC that is centrally managed. Every second it sends a summary of network flows through the NIC, in both directions, to a central ServerLock Manager system. This system then allows administrators to view these network flows graphically and easily turn them into security roles and policies that can then be deployed. Policies can then be deployed to a specific local IP address, a collection of addresses (think Docker containers or VMs) called an “IP Set”, a host or host groups. When deployed policies can be placed in Monitor or Enforce mode. Monitor Mode will allow all traffic to flow, but it will generate alerts for all traffic outside of all the defined policies for a local IP address. In Enforce mode, ONLY traffic conforming to the defined policies will be permitted. Traffic outside of those policies will generate an alert and be dropped. Once a network device begins to drop traffic on purpose we say that that device is segmenting the network. So in Enforce mode, ServerLock smart NICs will actively segment that server’s network by only passing traffic for supported applications, only those for which a policy exists. This applies to traffic in both directions, so for example, if an administrator walks into the data center, grabs a keyboard and elects to Secure Copy (SCP) a file from a database server to his workstation things will get interesting. If the ServerLock smart NIC in that database server doesn’t have a policy supporting SCP (port 22) his outbound request from that database server to his workstation will be dropped in the NIC. Likely unknown to him an alert will be generated on the central ServerLock Manager console calling out the application and both the database server and his workstation, and he’ll have some explaining to do.

ServerLock begins shipping this fall so while it’s too late for Equifax it’s not too late for the next Equifax. So how would this help moving forward? Simple, if every server, including web servers and database servers, has a ServerLock smart NIC then every second these servers would report their flow data to the central Solarflare ServerLock Manager for further analysis. Solarflare is working with Cloudwick to do real time analysis of this layer-3 traffic so that Cloudwick can then proactively suggest in real time back to ServerLock administrators new roles and policies to proactively protect servers against all sorts of threats. More to come as this product is released.

9/11/17 Update – It was released over the weekend that Equifax is now pointing the blame at an Apache Struts module. The exact module has yet to be disclosed, but it could be any one of the following that has been previously addressed. On Saturday The Apache group replied pointing to other sources that believe it might have been caused by exploiting a remote code execution bug in their REST plug in as outlined in CVE-2017-9805. More to come.

9/12/17 Update – Alert Logic has the best analysis thus far.

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Get Three Times More From NGINX

Recently Solarflare re-ran some tests with Nginx that measured the amount of traffic it could respond to before it started dropping requests. We then scaled up the number of cores provided to Nginx to see how additional compute resources impacted the servicing of web page requests, and this was the resulting graph:

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As you can see from the above graph most NIC implementations require about six cores to achieve 80% wire-rate. The major difference highlighted in this graph though is that with a Solarflare adapter, and their OpenOnload OS Bypass driver (also known as UKB, Universal Kernel Bypass) they can achieve 90% wire-rate performance utilizing ONLY two cores versus six. Note that this is with Intel’s most current 10G NIC the x710.

What’s interesting here though is that OpenOnload internally can bond together up to six 10G links, before a configuration file change is required to support more.  This could mean that a single 12 core server, running a single Nginx instance should be able to adequately service 90% wire-rate across all six 10G links, or theoretically 54Gbps of web page traffic. Now, of course, this is assuming everything is in memory, and the rest of the system is properly tuned. Viewed another way this is 4.5Gbps/core of web traffic serviced by Nginx running with OpenOnload on a Solarflare adapter compared to 1.4Gbps/core of web traffic with an Intel 10G NIC. This is a 3X gain in performance for Solarflare over Intel, how is the possible?

Simple, OpenOnload is a user space stack that communicates directly with the network adapter in the most efficient manner possible to service UDP & TCP requests. The latest version of OpenOnload has also been tuned to address the C10K problem. What’s important to note, is that by bypassing the Linux OS to service these communication requests Solarflare reduces the number of kernel context switches/core, memory copies, and can more effectively utilize the processor cache. All of this translates to more available cycles for Nginx on each and every core.

To further drive this point home we did an additional test just showing the performance gains OOL delivered to Nginx on 40GbE. Here you can see that the OS limits Nginx on a 10-core system to servicing about 15Gbps. With the addition of just OpenOnload to Nginx, that number jumps to 45Gbps. Again another 3X gain in performance.

If you have web servers today running Nginx, and you want to give them a gargantuan boost in performance please consider Solarflare and their OpenOnload technology. Imagine taking your existing web server today which has been running on a single Intel x520 dual port 10G card, replacing that with a Solarflare SFN7122F card, installing their OpenOnload drivers and seeing a 3X boost in performance. This is a fantastic way to breathe new life into existing installed web servers. Please consider contacting Solarflare today do a 10G OpenOnload proof of concept so you can see these performance gains for yourself first hand.

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R.I.P. TCP Offload Engine NICs (TOEs)

Solarflare Delivers Smart NICs for the Masses: Software Definable,  Ultra-Scalable, Full Network Telemetry with Built-in Firewall for True Application Segmentation, Standard Ethernet TCP/UDP Compliant

As this blog post by Michael C. Bazarewsky states, Microsoft quietly pulled support for TCP Chimney in its Windows 10 operating system. Chimney was an architecture for offloading the state and responsibility of a TCP connection to a NIC that supported it. The piece cited numerous technical issues and lack of adoption, and Michael’s analysis hits the nail on the head. Goodbye TOE NICs.

During the early years of this millennium, Silicon Valley venture capitalists dumped hundreds of millions of dollars into start-ups that would deliver the next generation of network interface cards at 10Gb/sec using TCP offload engines. Many of these companies failed under their weight of trying to develop expensive, complicated silicon that just did not work. Others received a big surprise in 2005 when Microsoft settled with Alacritech over patents they held describing Microsoft’s Chimney architecture. In a cross-license arrangement with Microsoft and Broadcom, Alacritech received many tens of millions of dollars in licensing fees. Alacritech would later get tens of millions of more fees from nearly every other NIC vendor implementing a TOE in their design. At the time, Broadcom was desperate to pave the way for their acquisition of Israeli based Siloquent. Due to server OEM pressure, the settlement was a small price to pay for the certain business Broadcom would garner from sales of the Siloquent device. At 1Gb/sec, Broadcom owned an astounding 100% of the server LAN-on-Motherboard (LOM) market, and yet their position was threatened by the onslaught of new, well-funded 10Gb start-ups.

In fact, the feature list for new “Ethernet” enhancements got so full of great ideas that most vendor’s designs relied on a complex “sea of cores” promising extreme flexibility that ultimately proved to be very difficult to qualify at the server OEMs. Any minor change to one code set would cause the entire design to fail in ways that were extremely difficult to debug, not to mention being miserably poor in performance. Most notably, Netxen, another 10Gb TOE NIC vendor, quickly failed after winning major design-ins at the three big OEMs, ultimately ending in a fire sale to Qlogic. Emulex saw the same pot of gold in its acquisition of ServerEngines.

That new impetus was a move by Cisco to introduce Fibre Channel Over Ethernet (FCoE) as a standard to converge networking and storage traffic. Cisco let Qlogic and Emulex (Q & E) inside the tent before their Unified Computing System (UCS) server introduction. But the setup took some time. It required a new set of Ethernet standards, now more commonly known as Data Center Bridging (DCB). DCB was a set of physical layer requirements that attempted to emulate the reliability of TCP by injecting wire protocols that would allow “lossless” transmission of packets. What a break for Q & E! Given the duopoly’s control over the Fibre Channel market, this would surely put both companies in the pole position to take over the Ethernet NIC market. Even Broadcom spent untold millions to develop a Fiber Channel driver that would run on their NIC.

Q & E quickly released what many called the “Frankenstein NIC,” a kluge of Applied-Specified Integrated Circuits (ASIC) designed to get a product to market even while struggling to develop a single ASIC, a skill at which neither company excelled. Barely achieving its targeted functionality, no design saw much traction. Through all of our customer interactions (over 1,650), we could find only one that had implemented FCoE. This large bank has since retracted its support for FCoE and in fact, showed a presentation slide several years ago stating they were “moving from FCoE to Ethernet,” an acknowledgment that FCoE was indeed NOT Ethernet.

In conjunction with TOEs, the industry pundits believed that RDMA (Remote Direct Memory Access) was another required feature to reduce latency, and not just for High-Frequency Trading (HFT), another acknowledgment that lowering latency was critical to the hyper-scale cloud, big data, and storage architectures. However, once again, while intellectually stimulating, using RDMA in any environment proved to be complex and simply not compatible with customers’ applications or existing infrastructures.

The latest RDMA push is to position it as the underlying fabric for Non-Volatile Memory Express (NVMeF). Why? Flash has already reduced the latency of storage access by an order of magnitude, and the next generation of flash devices will reduce latency and increase capacity even further. Whenever there’s a step function in the performance of a particular block of computer architecture, developers come up with new ways to use that capability to drive efficiencies and introduce new, and more interesting applications. Much like Moore’s Law, rotating magnetic memory is on its last legs. Several of our most significant customers have already stopped buying rotating memory in favor of Flash SSDs.

Well… here we go again. RDMA is NOT Ethernet. Despite the “fake news” about running RDMA, RoCE and iWARP on Ethernet, the largest cloud companies, and our large financial services customers have declared that they cannot and will not implement NVMeF using RDMA. It just doesn’t fit in their infrastructures or applications. They want low-latency standard Ethernet.

Since our company’s beginning, we’ve never implemented TOEs, RDMA or FCoE or any of the other great and technically sound ideas for changing Ethernet. Sticking to our guns, we decided to go directly to the market and create the pull for our products. The first market to embrace our approach was High-Frequency Trading (HFT). Over 99% of the world’s volume of Electronic trading, in all instruments, runs on our company’s NICs. Why? Customers could test and run our NICs without any application modifications or changes to their infrastructure and realize enormous benefits in latency, Jitter, message rate and robustness… it’s standard Ethernet, and our kernel bypass software has become the industry’s default standard.

It’s not that there isn’t room for innovation in server networking, it’s that you have to consider the customer’s ability to adapt and manage that change in a way that’s not inconsistent or disruptive to their infrastructure, while at the same time, delivering highly valued capabilities.

  • If companies are looking for innovation in server networking, they need to look for a company that can provide the following: Best-in-class PTP synchronization
  • Ultra-high resolution time stamps for every packet at every line rate
  • A method for lossless, unobtrusive, packet capture and analysis
  • Significant performance improvement in NGINX and LXC Containers
  • A firewall NIC and Application Micro-Segmentation that can control every app, VM, or container with unique security profiles
  • Real, extensive Software Definable Networking (SDN) without agents

In summary, while it’s taken a long time for the industry to realize its inertia, logic eventually prevailed.  Today, companies can now benefit from innovations in silicon and software architecture that are in deployment and have been validated by the market.   Innovative approaches such as neural-scale networking, which is designed to respond to the high-bandwidth, ultra-low-latency, hardware-based security, telemetry, and massive connectivity needs of ultra-scale computing, is likely the only strategy to achieve a next generation cloud and datacenter architecture that can scale, be easily managed, and maybe most importantly secured.

— Russell Stern, CEO Solarflare

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Cloaked Data Lakes

Once Jessie James was asked why he robbed banks and answered: “Because that’s where the money is?” Today a corporation’s most valuable asset, aside from its people, is its data. For those folks who are Star Trek fans imagine if you could engage your data lake’s network cloaking device just before deployment? It would waver out of view then totally disappear from your enterprise network to all but those who are responsible for extracting value from it. Your key data scientists and applications could still see and interact with your cloaked data lakes, but to others exploring and scanning the network, it would be entirely transparent as if it were not even there.

Imagine if you will that a Klingon Bird of Prey is cloaked and patrolling the Neutral Zone. Along comes the Federation Starship Enterprise, also patrolling the Neutral Zone, but the Federation is actively scanning the quadrant. Since the Klingon ship is Cloaked the Federation can’t detect them, but the moment the Enterprises scanners pass over the Bird of Prey it automatically jumps to red alert, energizes its weapons systems and alters course to shadow the Federation ship. Imagine if the same could be true of an insider threat or an internal breach via say a phishing attack that is seeking out your companies data. The moment someone pings a system or executes a port scan of even one IP addresses of the servers within your data lake alarm bells are set off, and no reply is returned. The scanner would see no answer, and expect that nothing exists, little would they know the hell that would soon reign down on them.

Your network administrators would then be alerted that their new server orchestration system had raised an alert. They’ll quickly see that the attacker is another admin’s workstation, someone that has been suspected of being an insider threat, but they’ve been too cagey to nail down. Now it’s 9 PM at night, and he’s port scanning the exact range of internal network addresses that were set aside a week earlier for this new data lake. He then moves on to softer targets exfiltrating data from older systems. Little does he know though that every server he’s touched the past week has been tracking and reporting every network flow back to his workstation. Management was just waiting for the perfect piece of evidence and this attempted port scan, along with all the other network flows was the final straw.

His plan had been to finish out the week, then quit on Friday and sell all his companies data to its competitors. He had decided to stay on an extra two weeks when he heard they were standing up a new Hadoop cluster. He figured that it would make a juicy soft target with tons of the newest aggregated data which could be enormously valuable. What he didn’t know, because he wasn’t invited to those planning meetings, was that the cluster included a new stealth security feature from Solarflare called Active Cloaking. He also wasn’t aware that that feature was the driving reason why many of his companies servers over the past two weeks had been upgraded to new Solarflare 10GbE NICs with ServerLock.

Since he was a server administrator responsible for some of the older legacy systems he wasn’t involved in the latest round of network upgrades. While he had noticed that lately some of the newer servers were no longer accessible to him via SSH, what he wasn’t aware of was that every server he touched was now reporting his every move. What would prove even more damning though was that some of those older servers, which had been upgraded with Solarflare ServerLock enabled NICs, were left as internal SSH/SCP honeypots with old legacy data that held little if any real value, but would prove damning evidence once compromised. Tonight had proved to be his downfall, his manager, and his VP, along with building security had just entered his cubical and stated that the police were on their way.

At Black Hat last month both Solarflare and Cloudwick (CDL) demonstrated ServerLock and data lake cloaking. In September several huge enterprises will begin testing SeverLock, and if you’re an insider threat consider yourself warned!

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